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COOPER v. AARON AND THE FACES OF FEDERALISM 
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT* 
The story of Cooper v. Aaron1 and the Little Rock desegregation crisis has 
many dimensions, one of the most important of which relates to federalism.  In 
particular, the consensus understanding is that Little Rock was a story of 
federalism gone spectacularly wrong.  Cut to the core, in Little Rock state 
government officials were illegitimately resisting the enforcement of federal 
law which was both legally and morally correct, creating a crisis which 
ultimately had to be resolved through the barrel of a gun (to be specific, the 
guns of the 101st Airborne), and through the unprecedented intervention of the 
United States Supreme Court.  Ultimately, however, Little Rock resulted in the 
triumph of federal law, including the Federal Constitution, as well as the 
reaffirmation of the supremacy of the Supreme Court as the ultimate expositor 
of the meaning of that law.  Concomitantly, the Little Rock crisis demonstrated 
the fundamental illegitimacy and immorality of state, as well as private, efforts 
to resist the implementation of federal law and the Federal Constitution, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court.  That is the abiding lesson of Little Rock, a 
lesson which has substantially shaped background assumptions and political 
discourse in the subsequent half century. 
It is the contention of this Article that this lesson is incorrect.  There is, I 
will argue, absolutely nothing improper about state officials resisting, even 
actively, the implementation of federal law or the Federal Constitution.  This is 
true as a matter of moral principle, and as a matter of constitutional obligation.  
Indeed, the contrary suggestion, that state officials are obliged to support and 
cooperate with the implementation of federal law, is inconsistent with the 
constitutional vision of the Framers.  Ultimately, what was wrong with the 
actions of Governor Faubus and other Arkansas state officials during the Little 
Rock crisis was not the fact that they were resisting federal authority, or even 
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 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1088 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1087 
that they were resisting the Constitution, it was the fact that they were 
threatening children with violence, and all in the name of defending an evil 
system of racial segregation.  In short, their error was a moral one, not a 
constitutional one. 
I.  THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS 
To understand the lessons and limits of Little Rock, some factual 
background is necessary.2  On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court announced its 
path-breaking decision in Brown v. Board of Education,3 holding that racial 
segregation of public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Soon thereafter, the Board of the Little Rock 
Independent School District in Arkansas announced its intention to voluntarily 
comply with Brown.4  The following year, the Little Rock School Board 
announced its desegregation plan, under which desegregation would begin in 
1957 with the admission of a small number of African American students into 
Central High School, and culminate in complete desegregation in the early 
1960s.5  Unhappy with the pace of desegregation under this plan, the NAACP 
(on behalf of African American parents) filed suit in early 1956.6  Their claims, 
however, were rejected by the district court,7 and in April of 1957 this holding 
was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on appeal.8  As of the summer of 1957, 
Little Rock appeared prepared to proceed with desegregation, with little local 
resistance. 
In the rest of Arkansas, however, the implementation of Brown met with 
more resistance.  In the fall of 1956, Arkansas voters approved a state 
constitutional amendment requiring that state officials resist Brown.9  And in 
August of 1957, at the eve of the new school year, Governor Orval Faubus of 
Arkansas instigated a series of actions designed to prevent desegregation 
(Faubus had, until this time, adopted a relatively moderate position on 
Brown).10  First, Governor Faubus arranged for white parents to file suit in 
state court, seeking to enjoin the admission of the African American students 
to Central High—a request which the state court granted.11  The next day, 
 
 2. The following description draws heavily upon Keith E. Whittington, The Court as the 
Final Arbiter of the Constitution: Cooper v. Aaron (1958), in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 9–21 (Gregg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2004). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. Whittington, supra note 2, at 10. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1956). 
 7. Id. at 866. 
 8. Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1957). 
 9. Whittington, supra note 2, at 12. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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however, at the school board’s request the federal district court entered an 
order enjoining the state plaintiffs from enforcing the state order—a decision 
which the Eighth Circuit eventually affirmed.12  His legal options exhausted, 
Governor Faubus turned to direct action. 
On Monday, September 2, 1957, Governor Faubus ordered the Arkansas 
National Guard to Central High School, with orders to prevent the nine African 
American children designated to initiate desegregation from entering Central 
High.13  Faubus’s decision was not based on any request by local officials, or 
any direct evidence of local unrest.14  The next day none of the children 
attempted to enter the school, but on September 4, after the district court 
ordered that desegregation proceed, the nine students appeared at Central 
High.15  They were turned back by the National Guard and a large and angry 
mob.16  On Monday, September 10, the district court requested that the federal 
government enter the case as amicus curiae, and seek an injunction against the 
Governor and officers of the Arkansas National Guard.17  Upon the federal 
government’s compliance, the district court ordered the Governor and officers 
to be added as party defendants to the Aaron v. Cooper litigation, and on 
September 21, following a hearing, the court issued an injunction forbidding 
the Arkansas state officials from obstructing or preventing the African 
American students from attending Central High.18 
The Governor complied, and from that point on he took no further actions 
which sought to physically resist the admission of the students.19  He, and other 
state officials, however continued to resist desegregation through other means, 
such as urging resistance to desegregation, adopting statutes which sought to 
interfere with desegregation efforts (for example, by passing a statute in 
January of 1957 eliminating the requirement of compulsory attendance in 
racially integrated schools),20 and ultimately, in September of 1958, closing the 
Little Rock public schools in the face of imminent desegregation, pursuant to 
laws passed during a special session of the Arkansas legislature called by 
Governor Faubus in August of 1958.21 
 
 12. Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1958); see also Whittington, 
supra note 2, at 12. 
 13. Whittington, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
 14. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225 (E.D. Ark. 1957). 
 15. Whittington, supra note 2, at 13. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Aaron, 156 F. Supp. at 222.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed this order on the same day it 
affirmed the injunction against the state court plaintiffs.  Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 
799, 808 (8th Cir. 1958); Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 808, 811 (8th Cir. 1958). 
 19. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 14. 
 20. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Ark. 1958). 
 21. Whittington, supra note 2, at 16–17.  The state legislation was ultimately struck down by 
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On Monday, September 23, 1957, nine African American students entered 
Central High, under the protection of the local police department (necessary 
because a large and violent mob remained gathered in front of the school).22  
At midday, the school sent the students home for safety reasons.23  The 
following day, President Eisenhower issued an order federalizing the Arkansas 
National Guard (thereby removing Governor Faubus from command of those 
forces), and simultaneously ordered the 101st Airborne to immediately deploy 
in Little Rock.24  On Wednesday, September 25, the African American 
students entered Central High under the protection of federal troops.25  They 
attended Central High for the rest of the school year, first under the protection 
of the 101st Airborne, and then under the protection of the federalized National 
Guard.26  Throughout the school year, the students (along with some school 
officials), were subjected to physical and verbal abuse and threats, both from 
fellow students and from adults.27 
In February of 1958, the Little Rock school board filed a petition with the 
federal district court, asking for permission to delay for several years 
implementation of its desegregation plan in light of the violent and unsettled 
conditions in and about the school.28  In June, the district court granted the 
petition.29  The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit, but also filed a direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court seeking a stay of the district court order.30  The 
Supreme Court denied the motion because the Eighth Circuit was the proper 
forum for an appeal, but concluded with the following thought: “[w]e have no 
doubt that the Court of Appeals will recognize the vital importance of the time 
element in this litigation, and that it will act upon the [appeal] in ample time to 
permit arrangements to be made for the next school year.”31  On August 18, 
1958, a divided, en banc Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding 
desegregation must proceed despite the disruption and violence.32  Two days 
later, President Eisenhower stated in a press conference that his feelings 
regarding Little Rock had not changed in the intervening year (i.e., that federal 
 
the federal courts, resulting in the reopening of the Little Rock schools, and their eventual 
desegregation, beginning in August of 1959.  Id. at 20. 
 22. Whittington, supra note 2, at 14–15. 
 23. Id. at 15. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 36 (8th Cir. 1958). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Whittington, supra note 2, at 15. 
 29. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F.Supp. 13, 32 (E.D. Ark. 1958). 
 30. Aaron v. Cooper, 357 U.S. 566, 567 (1958). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Aaron, 257 F.2d at 40. 
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troops remained available to enforce judicial orders).33  In the meantime, 
however, the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit (who had dissented from the en 
banc decision) stayed the Eighth Circuit decision, thereby maintaining the 
district court’s order permitting the delay to remain in place.34  The NAACP 
filed an immediate petition with the Supreme Court.35  In response, Chief 
Justice Warren called a special session of the Court, and ordered hearings on 
August 28 and September 11.36  On September 12, the Court issued a brief 
order affirming the Eighth Circuit, thereby permitting the Little Rock schools 
to open on September 15.37  On September 29, the Court issued its full 
opinion.38 
II.  WHAT THE COURT SAID 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper v. Aaron was important and 
unusual, both because of its format and its message.  The format was unusual 
because the Court issued an opinion signed jointly by all nine Justices, an 
unprecedented event clearly designed to emphasize the institutional 
significance of the decision.  The message was important both because it 
strongly reaffirmed the Court’s commitment to its holding in Brown, and 
because it conveyed an extremely strong statement of judicial supremacy in 
constitutional interpretation.  My focus is on the second of the Court’s 
messages, and what it meant. 
The conventional understanding of the judicial supremacy holding of 
Cooper is that Cooper represents the Court’s strongest assertion of primacy in 
the power of constitutional interpretation, superior to that of all elected 
officials.  The following quotation from the opinion captures this thought: 
[Marbury v. Madison] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has 
ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.  It follows that the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the 
Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution 
makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws 
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  Every state legislator and 
executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to 
Art. VI, ¶ 3 “to support this Constitution.”39 
 
 33. Whittington, supra note 2, at 16. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 39. Id. at 18. 
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This passage appears to state the following syllogism (though not in this 
order).  First, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, binding on all 
officials.  Second, the Supreme Court possesses the ultimate authority to 
interpret and give meaning to the Constitution.  Therefore, all officials are 
bound to obey and support the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Constitution. 
Needless to say, the understanding of judicial authority expressed in 
Cooper has proven highly controversial.  In particular, the Court’s equation, in 
Cooper, of the Constitution with the Court’s interpretations of the Constitution 
has been heavily criticized.40  Interestingly, however, this criticism has focused 
almost exclusively upon the relationship between the Supreme Court and other 
federal officials (notably Congress and the President) in the task of 
constitutional interpretation.  Thus, the critics cite as evidence against Cooper 
Lincoln’s First Inaugural rejecting the binding force of the Dred Scott case on 
the President,41 as well as the need for independent congressional authority to 
interpret the Civil War amendments in the course of enforcing them.42  The 
general (though not universally accepted) consensus seems to be that 
acceptance of the Cooper Court’s vision of judicial supremacy vis-à-vis federal 
officials would strike a fundamental blow to our system of balance of powers, 
by removing all checks on the judiciary within its sphere of authority. 
What is peculiar about this criticism of Cooper is not that it is wrong, but 
that it is beside the point.  Cooper was not a case about inter-branch conflict 
within the federal government; it was about a conflict between the federal 
judiciary and a state government.  Indeed, President Eisenhower had 
demonstrated rather clearly in Little Rock in 1957 that the executive branch 
would not contest judicial authority over desegregation,43 and had orally 
reconfirmed that commitment just a month before Cooper was decided.44  Nor 
had Congress taken any active steps to oppose the judiciary.  Thus, the real 
question in Cooper was the relationship between judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution and state officials.  Indeed, the critical passages in Cooper 
 
 40. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 8–9, 
14–15, 22–23 (1999); Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 194 (1997); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the 
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 986 (1987); Michael Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 225 (1994).  But see generally Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 1359 (1997) (defending judicial supremacy). 
 41. First Inaugural Address, 7 PUB. PAPERS 3210–11 (March 4, 1861). 
 42. See McConnell, supra note 40, at 174–81. 
 43. See Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, United States of America, to John C. 
Stennis, Senator (D., Miss.), United States Senate (Oct. 7, 1957), available at 
http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/dl/LittleRock/littlerockdocuments.html. 
 44. Whittington, supra note 2, at 16. 
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regarding judicial power say only that “[n]o state legislator or executive or 
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his 
undertaking to support it.”45  Furthermore, the Court relies in reaching this 
conclusion on the Supremacy Clause,46 which is addressed to state, not federal 
law (leaving aside the doubtful argument that the Clause also supports the 
institution of judicial review of congressional legislation).47 
So, what the Court said in Cooper v. Aaron was that when the Supreme 
Court of the United States announces an authoritative interpretation of the 
Constitution, it is obligatory upon state officials to comply with, and support, 
that interpretation.  This is a much more modest statement than the overarching 
claim of judicial supremacy for which Cooper is cited (including by the 
Supreme Court).48  Indeed, many of the concerns expressed regarding judicial 
supremacy in constitutional exposition vis-à-vis the President and Congress do 
not generally arise in the context of state officials because the occasions in 
which state officials will have to interpret the Constitution in the course of 
their duties are inevitably more rare.  Furthermore, there are sound structural 
reasons why one might wish to distinguish between state and federal officials 
in this area: the President and the members of Congress are national officials, 
chosen by the people of this nation to implement the general scheme of the 
Constitution.  Each is subject to substantial institutional checks, internally, 
externally (notably from each other), and democratically, which are likely to 
constrain unreasonable constitutional positions.  And both Congress and the 
President, as federal officials, have special expertise and experience regarding 
the meaning of the Federal Constitution.  None of these things can be said 
about the myriad of state and local officials in this country, who are not 
nationally accountable, who do not face the special institutional checks and 
balances (themselves reflecting national pressures) set forth in the 
Constitution, and who have no special authority or expertise regarding the 
Constitution.  As such, federal judicial supremacy over state officials on 
constitutional issues seems both more important, and less troublesome, than 
over federal officials—a thought reflected in Holmes’s famous comment 
regarding the need for federal judicial power over the states.49  All of this 
 
 45. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (arguing that the oath of 
office taken by officials requires them to remain loyal first and foremost to the Constitution, and 
then to the individual laws of each state). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000). 
 49. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law School Association of 
New York: Law and the Court (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295–96 
(1920) (“I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an 
Act of Congress void.  I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that 
declaration as to the laws of the several States.”). 
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perhaps explains why, even though the broader implications of the statements 
in Cooper suggesting judicial supremacy over federal officials has proven 
controversial, few people in recent years have challenged the Cooper Court’s 
more specific position regarding the obligations of state officials.  Nonetheless, 
the Court’s position is quite wrong. 
III.  WHAT THE COURT MEANT 
To understand the difficulty with the Court’s statements in Cooper, it is 
first necessary to parse out what the Cooper Court meant by its assertion of 
judicial supremacy.  In particular, one must determine specifically what 
obligations the Court was asserting were imposed on state officials by its 
decision in Brown, because much turns on that question.  As it turns out, 
Cooper is rather ambiguous on this question, but insofar as the Court did 
suggest some answers, they are sweeping and troubling. 
At a minimum, the Court might have been saying that it was unlawful for 
Governor Faubus to order the National Guard to prevent the entry of African 
American students into Central High School in September of 1957.  If so, that 
claim is surely correct and (today) uncontroversial.  Faubus’s actions may well 
have constituted contempt of court from the start,50 and certainly could have 
been punishable as contempt after the district court enjoined them on 
September 21.  Furthermore, as a general matter it seems unproblematic to 
assert that state officials may not, consistent with their oaths and the 
Supremacy Clause, physically obstruct the enforcement of federal law, 
including federal judicial orders.  The problem with this narrow reading of 
Cooper is that it cannot explain the case.  Faubus’s troops were in place 
outside of Central High School for at most three weeks in September of 1957, 
and were removed immediately upon the district court’s issuance of its 
injunction—as the Supreme Court acknowledged.51  These events occurred a 
full year before the Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper v. Aaron, and nine 
months before the district court decision that the Court was reviewing.  The 
issue before the Court was the Little Rock school board’s request to delay 
implementation of desegregation because of disruption to the school which 
occurred during the school year, after the African American students had 
entered Central High.52  These events, by definition, occurred after the 
Governor had ended any direct interference with the district court’s orders.  
Rather, as a perusal of the district court and appellate opinions on this issue 
make clear, the sources of the disruption complained of were fellow (white) 
 
 50. See Roe v. Operation Rescue, 54 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Hall, 472 
F.2d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 1972) (both holding non-parties in contempt of court). 
 51. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 11–12.  Indeed, some sources suggest that the troops were 
withdrawn before the injunction.  See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 2, at 14. 
 52. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4–5. 
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students, and other members of the public, who were engaged in a campaign of 
intimidation and violence.  There was no evidence cited by either court 
suggesting that the Governor or other state officials were coordinating or 
supporting this action, other than by their public statements opposing 
desegregation and federal authority.  In short, while Governor Faubus’s 
behavior during the Little Rock crisis of 1957 was both appalling and illegal, it 
had little direct bearing on the issue before the Court in 1958. 
Clearly, then, when the Cooper Court spoke of the obligations of state 
officials, it meant something more than simply desisting from physical 
interference with federal authority.  Some hints of what the Court did mean can 
be found in the Court’s description of the facts of the case, and in particular its 
(disapproving) descriptions of the actions of state officials.53  Thus the Court 
notes that while the Little Rock school board was preparing its desegregation 
plan, “other state authorities . . . were actively pursuing a program designed to 
perpetuate in Arkansas the system of racial segregation” struck down in 
Brown, including enacting a constitutional amendment requiring the legislature 
to oppose Brown “in every Constitutional manner,” and legislation which 
would interfere with desegregation by eliminating mandatory attendance at 
integrated schools.54  The Court also notes that prior to the deployment of the 
National Guard on September 2, “no crowds had gathered about Central High 
School and no acts of violence or threats of violence . . . had occurred,”55 and 
further that according to the school board itself, “[t]he effect of that action [of 
the Governor] was to harden the core of opposition to the Plan.”56  From all of 
this, the Court concludes that the conditions at Central High, and the disruption 
of the school year, “are directly traceable to the actions of legislators and 
executive officials of the State of Arkansas, taken in their official capacities, 
which reflect their own determination to resist this Court’s decision in the 
Brown case and which have brought about violent resistance to that decision in 
Arkansas.”57  The Court goes on to quote the Little Rock School Board as 
saying that “[t]he legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state 
government opposed the desegregation of Little Rock schools by enacting 
laws, calling out troops, making statements villifying [sic] federal law and 
federal courts, and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial 
processes to maintain public peace.”58  Finally, the Court concludes that the 
constitutional rights recognized in Brown “can neither be nullified openly and 
directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified 
 
 53. See id. at 8–9. 
 54. Id. at 8–9. 
 55. Id. at 9 (quoting Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 225 (E.D. Ark. 1957)). 
 56. Id. at 10 (second alteration in original). 
 57. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 14. 
 58. Id. at 15. 
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indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted 
‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’”59 
The import of these passages seems relatively clear.  In the face of the 
Brown decision, the obligation of state officials went well beyond desisting 
from physically interfering with the enforcement of federal court orders.  
These obligations extended to not adopting legislation which would interfere 
with desegregation and to not engaging in actions which would “harden the 
core of opposition.”  Indeed, the Court’s opinion strongly suggests that state 
officials violated their constitutional obligations in “villifying [sic] federal law 
and federal courts,” in a context where such speech would encourage private 
resistance, and further, that state officials had a positive obligation to “utilize 
state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes” to help enforce federal 
law.60 
The Court had to take such an aggressive stance because it was simply not 
feasible to claim that all of the lawlessness and chaos that ensued during the 
1957–1958 school year was traceable solely to Governor Faubus’s short-lived 
deployment of the National Guard in September.  The truth is that, as the 
Court’s opinion implicitly acknowledges, opposition to desegregation had been 
building steadily throughout the previous year, and had already taken the form 
of legislative actions and rising discontent.  Faubus was at bottom a simple 
opportunist, albeit an especially distasteful one, who was riding a political 
wave (one in which his earlier record suggests he did not even personally 
believe61).  He did nothing to aid the cause of law and order, and undoubtedly 
made matters worse by all of his actions, including but not limited to those of 
September, 1957; but, he was not the source of the problem. 
The question is then posed: Was the Supreme Court correct to assert that in 
the wake of Brown, state and local government officials in Arkansas had a 
legal obligation to desist from enacting legislation, or taking other actions, 
which obstructed or encouraged others to obstruct the implementation of 
Brown in Little Rock?  And further, did those officials have a positive 
obligation to deploy the resources of the state to maintain law and order as 
necessary to assist federal officials in implementing Brown?  It is tempting to 
assert that the answer to both of these questions must be, “yes.”  After all, the 
actions of officials in Arkansas and elsewhere in the South in the wake of 
Brown resulted in violence, massive human suffering, and the denial of 
 
 59. Id. at 17 (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940)). 
 60. Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion attempting to soften the Court’s rhetoric 
by recognizing that the duty to “abstain from resistance” to the Court’s decisions “does not 
require immediate approval of it nor does it deny the right of dissent.  Criticism need not be 
stilled.”  But even he concludes that “[a]ctive obstruction or defiance is barred.”  Id. at 24 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 61. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
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constitutional rights to thousands of African American school children.  It is 
also tempting to agree with Justice Frankfurter that the rule of law, and basic 
democratic values, require that disagreement with decisions of the Supreme 
Court must be pursued through legal processes, and not through obstruction.62  
Those temptations, however, should be resisted.  The position of the Supreme 
Court in Cooper misapprehends the role of state governments in our federal 
system, and inappropriately seeks to channel a system of political checks and 
balances into legal mechanisms.  To understand why this is so, it is necessary 
to go back to some first principles regarding the structure of our government. 
IV.  FEDERALISM AND BALANCED POWERS 
In the debates over ratification of the Constitution during 1787 and 1788, 
the primary objection raised by the opponents of the new Constitution was the 
concern that the new, distant national government would act in an oppressive 
and undemocratic manner.  Supporters of the Constitution had many responses 
to this concern, but one of the most prominent ones was that the division of 
powers within the new Republic obviated such concerns, because attempted 
usurpations by any single government actor would be countered by the actions 
of others.63  That this principle explains and justifies the separation of powers 
within the federal government is of course well accepted and uncontroversial.64  
As Madison recognized in Federalist No. 51, however, federalism is as 
important a part of our system of limited and balanced powers as is the 
separation of powers at the national level: 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is 
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each, subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people.  The different governments will 
controul each other; at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.65 
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that as with each of the departments 
of the federal government, for the checks and balances of federalism to work, 
each different government must “have a will of its own” and “the necessary 
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the 
others.”66  In short, for federalism to work as designed, state governments, no 
 
 62. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 23–24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
 64. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[I]t was ‘the central judgment 
of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of 
governmental powers into three coordinate branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.’”) 
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed.,1982). 
 66. Id. at 261, 262. 
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less than the branches of the national government, must have the ability to 
resist the (to their minds) improper assertions of power from the center. 
Nor is Madison silent about the means available to states in resisting 
national authority.  In Federalist No. 46 he discusses this point extensively.  
Responding to the argument that the federal government may seek to “extend 
its power beyond the due limits,” he says the following: 
On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal government 
be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or 
even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the 
means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand.  The disquietude of the 
people, their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of 
the Union, the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State, the 
embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on 
such occasions, would oppose, in any State difficulties not to be despised; 
would form, in a large State very serious impediments, and where the 
sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present 
obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to 
encounter.67 
Consider the implications of this passage.  In it, Madison is explicitly 
endorsing the idea of state resistance to federal law, as a significant part of our 
constitutional structure.  Moreover, he is accepting that state resistance will 
take the form not only of vocal opposition to federal policy, but also “refusal to 
co-operate” with federal officers and even “legislative devices,” which in 
combination might pose insurmountable obstacles to the enforcement of 
federal law.  In short, Madison is saying that when state officials disagree with 
federal policy, they can and should be expected to take active steps to make 
life difficult for the federal officials charged with enforcing that policy. 
Furthermore, modern constitutional law tends to support Madison’s 
position, and thereby undermine some of the more extreme claims regarding 
the obligations of state officials made by the Cooper Court.  Most obviously, in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Court held 
that states have no general, constitutional obligation to protect their citizens 
from the actions of other, private individuals.68  This result seems entirely 
irreconcilable with the Court’s suggestion in Cooper that state officials had an 
obligation to “maintain public peace.”  Recent decisions have also held that the 
federal government may not constitutionally “commandeer” state legislatures 
and state executive officials, by obligating them to enact congressionally 
 
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 240–41 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).  
Interestingly, Madison later comments that the “only refuge” left for those opposed to a strong 
central government was the argument that a federal military force would enable it to impose its 
will on the states, but he dismisses such concerns as “incoherent” and “[e]xtravagant.”  Id. at 241. 
 68. 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989). 
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mandated legislative programs, or to enforce federal law.69  These holdings 
would be meaningless if state officials had some preexisting, independent 
obligation to cooperate with, or participate in, the enforcement of federal law.  
Therefore, it must be that there is no such obligation. 
One objection against the above position might run as follows: Whatever 
the structure and background understandings of federalism in the framing era, 
the Civil War and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 so 
radically altered federal-state relationships as to make previous assumptions 
invalid.  This argument, however, over-reads the impact of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on federalism.  There is no doubt that the Amendment 
fundamentally altered the authority of the federal government over the states, 
by imposing significant, substantive constitutional limitations on state action.  
Absent those limitations, of course, there would have been no legal basis for 
Brown v. Board, or the district court orders commanding desegregation in 
Little Rock (and so concomitantly, for the actions of the 101st Airborne in 
enforcing those orders).  But, the Fourteenth Amendment did not eliminate the 
role of states as separate sovereigns in our system of government, nor did it 
eliminate (or purport to eliminate) the role of those states as checks on federal 
power.70  Rather, what the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments did was 
to create a role for the federal government as a significant check on state power 
as well. 
A more significant objection might be based on an alleged distinction 
between federal judicial orders and federal legislative or executive policies.  
Perhaps there is a difference between courts and the other branches of 
government, such that resistance to the latter is fine, but to the former is not.  
On its face, however, this distinction seems to make little sense.  After all, 
generally the job of federal courts is to interpret and enforce federal law.  
Given this, there seems no apparent reason why, in general, the 
implementation of federal law through a court order should fundamentally alter 
the relative roles of state and federal actors in this area. 
Two caveats are necessary here.  First, the above argument should 
probably be limited to state executive and legislative officials.  Under the 
Supremacy Clause, state judges, unlike other state officials, are bound to treat 
all federal law as supreme over state law. 71  Furthermore, the Constitution, at 
least as interpreted in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,72 creates a hierarchical 
 
 69. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
 70. Cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Tenth 
Amendment was not, after all, repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified; it was 
merely limited.”). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. 
 72. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 
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relationship between state judiciaries and the United States Supreme Court, 
while state executive and legislative officials most assuredly are not subject to 
the direct supervision of any federal officials.  Given this relationship, and 
given the need for judicial systems to function efficiently without imposing 
needless appeals and delays on litigants, a fairly persuasive argument can be 
constructed that state judges are bound to respect and follow (i.e., enforce) the 
precedents of the United States Supreme Court.73  Of course, this argument 
may be incorrect.  It may be that popularly elected state judges, like popularly 
elected state legislative and executive officials, have a legitimate role to play in 
resisting federal policies, including Supreme Court decisions, which they see 
as undesirable.74  At minimum, however, it is clear that the reasons advanced 
for state judicial adherence to Supreme Court precedent have no application to 
nonjudicial state officials. 
The second caveat is that when a federal court issues an order directed at 
nonjudicial state officials, it must be obeyed—or to be more accurate, refusal 
to obey may properly be punished as contempt.  It is also probably true that 
indirectly evading a judicial order by soliciting third parties to accomplish 
what the judicial decree forbids should be punishable as contempt no less than 
direct defiance.  Moreover, in this area, judicial orders are different from 
executive or legislative actions in that disobedience of the judiciary may be 
punished even if the order itself is later determined to be invalid.75  That does 
not mean, however, that state officials cannot criticize judicial decrees with 
which they disagree, as the Cooper Court suggests.  More fundamentally, there 
is no general obligation on the part of nonjudicial state officials to cooperate 
with the implementation of federal laws or decrees directed at others, much 
less to help enforce them.  That is the task of federal officials. 
Finally, and most potentially persuasively, an argument might be made that 
whatever the general status of court orders, when a court order is based on the 
Constitution of the United States, and in particular when a court order 
adjudicates individual constitutional rights, a special obligation might be 
imposed upon state officials to obey and help implement that decision.  This 
argument might be buttressed by reference to the “Oath or Affirmation” Clause 
of Article VI of the Constitution, which imposes on all state officials an 
obligation to support the Constitution, but not other federal law.76  Tempting as 
 
(1821). 
 73. See James Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality 
of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 238 (2007). 
 74. For a fascinating account of state courts behaving in precisely this fashion, see Frederic 
M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORN. L. REV. 501 (2008). 
 75. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315, 320–21 (1967). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  As  noted above, the Supremacy Clause, by contrast, does 
make all federal law supreme; but it explicitly binds only state judges, not other officials, to that 
law.  See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
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it is, however, ultimately this argument cannot stand.  It is based on two 
separate fallacies, both of which are important legacies of Cooper v. Aaron. 
The first of these fallacies is the error of equating the Constitution with the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of its terms.  As noted above, this aspect of 
Cooper has been widely criticized in the literature, albeit primarily in reference 
to federal officials.77  This criticism must be correct, because the contrary view 
would leave no room to argue that the Supreme Court has erred in its 
interpretation, as has obviously happened on innumerable occasions 
throughout our history.  But the criticism applies equally to state officials.  
After all, once one acknowledges a gap between the Constitution and judicial 
expositions thereof, logically that gap informs the meaning of the Article VI 
requirement of loyalty to the Constitution.  Moreover, there are strong practical 
reasons to permit state, as well as national, officials to adopt views of 
constitutional meaning that differ from the Court’s.  Failure to do so would 
leave national officials with a monopoly on contesting constitutional meaning.  
But national officials share certain biases in this regard—in favor of national 
power, in derogation of state authority, in derogation of local diversity—which 
state officials do not.  More generally, it is easy to imagine times when certain 
aspects of our constitutional system become unpopular at the national level, 
and even in many parts of the country, but which might be championed by 
state officials in some regions.  To silence those voices would be to 
substantially enervate constitutional dialogue. 
The obvious response to the above argument is, of course, the principle of 
institutional settlement, championed most forcefully in recent years by 
Professors Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer.78  Alexander and Schauer 
defend Cooper’s assertion of judicial supremacy on the grounds that settlement 
is one of the basic functions of law generally, and of constitutionalism in 
particular, and that settlement is possible only through deference to the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretations.79  While a full response to 
Alexander and Schauer is necessarily beyond the scope of this paper, a brief 
response can be sketched here.  The difficulty with the Alexander and Schauer 
argument is that while settlement is generally a virtue within a legal system, it 
is not a universal virtue within a political system.  In particular, it is difficult to 
reconcile a strong constitutional commitment to settlement with the system of 
divided and balanced powers that our Constitution creates.  Divided powers 
envision disputation and political disagreement, the very opposite of 
settlement.  As such, while the value of settlement might support adherence to 
Supreme Court interpretations within the judiciary, including state 
 
 77. See sources cited in supra note 40. 
 78. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 40. 
 79. Id. at 1362. 
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judiciaries,80 its extension to executive and legislative officials seems in deep 
tension with the fundamentally political, rather than legal, functions of such 
officials. 
The second fallacy, more subtle but even more insidious, is the modern 
tendency to equate federal law, and the federal Constitution, with morality.81  
This tendency is clearly the legacy of Cooper v. Aaron and the Civil Rights Era 
more generally.  The battle to implement Brown and desegregate the South was 
undoubtedly the most important legal, political, and moral battle of domestic 
American politics in the past century.  And it was a battle in which, as 
essentially everyone now concedes, the Federal Constitution and (eventually) 
the federal government were on the right side.  After all, the actions of 
Governor Faubus and others in Little Rock, in using military force and mob 
violence to intimidate children in the name of resisting Brown, were obviously 
and grotesquely evil.  Federal troops restored justice, and eventually federal 
law (in the form of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965) succeeding in imposing morality on a recalcitrant South.82  The 
advancement of civil rights by the Warren and early Burger Courts, along with 
other generally popular decisions from that time such as Reynolds v. Simms,83 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,84 and (perhaps) Roe v. Wade,85 has lead the public to 
equate federal law and the Federal Constitution with morality.  But it must be 
understood that this easy association of constitutional law with morality is an 
historical aberration.  Americans of the New Deal Era, raised with the excesses 
of Lochner,86 would surely have understood this point, as would Americans (or 
at least Northerners) of the late nineteenth century, who witnessed the Supreme 
Court demolish the accomplishments of Reconstruction in the name of the 
Constitution.87  And, of course, the previous generation had Dred Scott as its 
prime example of the (im)moral force of constitutional law.88  Finally, it must 
be recognized that a large number of contemporary Americans have grave 
 
 80. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 81. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(expressing personal distaste at holding that First Amendment protects flag burning). 
 82. Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
 83. 377 U.S. 533, 554–55, 561 (1964) (finding that vote dilution through legislative 
malapportionment violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 84. 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (striking down Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Statute as 
violating the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment). 
 85. 410 U.S. 113, 152–55 (1973) (finding a fundamental constitutional right to choose an 
abortion). 
 86. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
 87. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21–23 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 
U.S. 629, 638–40 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554–56 (1875); United States 
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1875). 
 88. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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doubts about the moral force of many decisions of the Supreme Court in areas 
including affirmative action,89 privacy,90 and free speech.91  Whatever one’s 
ultimate conclusions about the legal and moral legitimacy of various Supreme 
Court decisions, the era of easy conflation of positive constitutional law with 
morality is surely over.92 
The Constitution, then, is not equivalent to constitutional law as enunciated 
by the federal courts.  And federal law, including but not limited to 
constitutional law, does not consistently produce positive moral outcomes.  
Indeed, federal law can sometimes produce positively immoral outcomes.  The 
question that remains open is what role state officials have to play in resisting, 
or at least reshaping, those outcomes.  In the next Part, I briefly discuss a few 
examples, some contemporary and some historical, where state officials have 
played quite a significant such role. 
V.  SOME EXAMPLES 
A.  Immigration and Sanctuary Cities 
Immigration policy is, of course, an area where the federal government 
enjoys plenary and unshared power.  The Constitution explicitly grants to 
Congress the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,”93 and the 
Supreme Court has long recognized the primacy of federal authority vis-à-vis 
the states in this area.94  Nonetheless, recent events demonstrate that even in 
this area of federal dominance, state and local governments can play an 
important role in shaping law and policy. 
Immigration policy, and in particular the appropriate response to the 
existence of a very large population of undocumented aliens residing in the 
United States, has been one of the most contentious political and policy issues 
 
 89. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751–52 (2007) (holding that school districts may not consider a child’s race in 
assigning him or her to schools within the district); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
227 (1995) (holding that racial classifications imposed by the government in a federal program 
designed to provide contracts to minority businesses warrant strict scrutiny). 
 90. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. __ , 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1628–29, 1632 (2007) 
(holding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act is not facially invalid as it is not overly vague, 
nor does it burden women’s rights to abortion). 
 91. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622, 2629 (2007) (holding 
that the suspension of a student for displaying a banner that referenced drug use did not offend the 
First Amendment). 
 92. It must be admitted that for opponents of abortion, that conflation probably ended long 
ago. 
 93. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 94. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 
(1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
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facing the second Bush Administration.  The debate over these issues largely 
reflects a divide between those supporting proposals, supported by the 
Administration, to provide a path to citizenship to these aliens,95 and proposals 
to deal with this population punitively (including in one proposal through 
criminalization).96  The resulting stalemate has lead to essentially no 
meaningful congressional action in this area.  But, of course, federal 
enforcement of existing immigration laws, including deportations, continues, 
and the Bush Administration has taken various steps to tighten enforcement of 
such laws, with mixed success.97 
In the face of this federal policy, a large number of cities, including New 
York City, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Seattle, have 
taken the step of making themselves “Sanctuary Cities.”98  The essence of this 
designation is the adoption of policies, whether explicit or implicit, under 
which city employees are instructed not to cooperate with federal immigration 
officials, and to dispense city services regardless of immigration status 
(accomplished by declining to inquire about immigrant status).99  The City of 
New Haven, Connecticut has taken such policies one step further, by issuing 
identification cards to undocumented aliens,100 an approach which San 
Francisco is considering emulating.101 
Needless to say, such policies have attracted vigorous criticism from the 
federal government102 and from political candidates.103  And in a predictable 
twist, at least one commentator has likened sanctuary policies to the 
“nullification doctrine” espoused by slave states before the Civil War.104  
 
 95. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2007). 
 96. See, e.g., Immigrant Enforcement and Border Security Act of 2007, S. 1984, 110th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
 97. See American Federation of Labor v. Chertoff, No. C 07-04472, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75233, at *7–13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2007); Spencer S. Hsu, Immigrant Crackdown Halted, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2007, at A03. 
 98. See Jesse McKinley, Immigrant Protection Rules Draw Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2006, at 22. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Caitlin Carpenter, City Opts to Validate Its Illegal Residents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
July 17, 2007, at 2. 
 101. Wyatt Buchanan, S.F. Has a Plan for Immigrant ID Card, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., 
Sept. 7, 2007, at A1. 
 102. Audrey Hudson, Chertoff Warns Meddling “Sanctuary Cities,” WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2007, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070906/ 
NATION/109060085/1001. 
 103. See Alexander Mooney, Romney Blasts “Sanctuary Cities” for Attracting Illegal 
Immigrants, CNN, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/08/21/romney. 
immigration.ad/index.html; Fred Thompson, Sanctuary Cities, TOWNHALL.COM, Aug. 14, 2007, 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/FredThompson/2007/08/14/sanctuary_cities. 
 104. Mark Krikorian, Washington Needs to Act to Rein in those States and Cities that are 
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Given the holding of Printz v. United States,105 however, such policies would 
appear to be perfectly constitutional.  Of course, jurisdictions adopting 
sanctuary policies cannot, and do not, directly interfere with the enforcement 
of federal law by federal officials.106  Furthermore, a recent Department of 
Justice report suggests that in practice, local officials are avoiding direct 
conflict with federal officials by collecting and providing immigration 
information if required by federal law.107  But there is no doubt that the 
systematic lack of cooperation by vast numbers of local officials in America’s 
largest cities, including most importantly their failure to voluntarily share 
information with federal officials, must substantially hamper federal efforts to 
enforce federal immigration policy.  As such, sanctuary policies are a prime 
example of effective resistance by state and local officials to federal laws 
which they find (to quote Madison) “unwarrantable.”108 
B. Medical Marijuana 
In November of 1996, California voters approved Proposition 215.109  This 
provision amended California law to create an exemption from existing state 
drug laws for patients and caregivers to possess or cultivate marijuana for 
medical treatment, as recommended by a doctor (the law also protects 
doctors).110  Since 1996, eleven other states have also adopted provisions 
legalizing medical marijuana.111  Notably, ten of the twelve states legalizing 
medical marijuana are in the West.  Federal law, however, continues to 
prohibit the possession and cultivation of marijuana.112  The Supreme Court 
 
Attempting to Nullify Federal Policy, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 30, 2007, at E1. 
 105. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (holding that the federal government 
may not compel the states to implement federal regulatory programs). 
 106. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDIT DIVISION, 
COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE 
UNITED STATES 25–33 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0707/ 
final.pdf. 
 107. Id. at 25–33.  The landscape here is complicated by 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996), which bars 
state and local governments from prohibiting the maintaining or sharing with federal immigration 
officials of information regarding immigration status.  This provision seems to be largely 
unenforced—perhaps because there is a strong argument to be made that it is unconstitutional 
under Printz.  See 521 U.S. at 925. 
 108. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed. 1982). 
 109. See Proposition 215: Text of Proposed Law, http://vote96.sos.ca.gov/BP/215text.htm 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 110. Id. 
 111. These states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.  See Summary of State Medical Marijuana 
Laws, http://www.medicalmarijuanaprocon.org/pop/StatePrograms.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 
2008) (describing state laws in detail). 
 112. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 844(a) (2000). 
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has upheld these laws as within Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce,113 and has rejected the claim that there is a “necessity” defense to 
federal law available to medical marijuana users.114  As such, federal law in 
this area is flatly inconsistent with the laws and policies of a very large number 
of states, encompassing almost an entire, significant, geographic region of this 
country. 
There is, of course, no direct conflict between state laws legalizing medical 
marijuana, and federal laws prohibiting all marijuana possession.  In practice, 
however, the implementation of these state laws will inevitably interfere, 
sometimes substantially, with the enforcement of federal law.  For example, as 
part of its implementation of Proposition 215, the State of California issues 
identification cards to approved medical marijuana users,115 and numerous 
local officials have publicly supported the activities of cannabis clubs that have 
cropped up in California to distribute medical marijuana.116  None of this 
prevents federal officials from prosecuting (or enjoining) the activities of either 
medical marijuana users or clubs—as in fact they continue to do;117 but in 
practice such policies make enforcement of federal law far more difficult, 
given the obvious reality that federal officials lack the local presence and 
resources necessary to eliminate all cultivation or possession of marijuana, 
even that which is carried out openly. 
Medical marijuana thus represents another contemporary example of state 
and local resistance to federal law.  In contrast to immigration, the resistance 
here is more indirect, and its impact on federal policy is harder to determine.  
One thing suggesting that the impact is significant is that the Department of 
Justice itself has concluded that marijuana is widely available and consumed in 
Northern California, at least in part because of “abuse” of Proposition 215.118  
It is hard to know how seriously to take this assessment, however, given that 
marijuana was hardly unavailable in Northern California prior to 1996.119  In 
any event, it can probably be said with some confidence that state medical 
 
 113. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
 114. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001). 
 115. Press Release, California Department of Health Services, California Resumes Medicial 
Marijuana ID Card Program (July 18, 2005), available at http://www.applications.dhs.ca.gov/ 
pressreleases/store/pressreleases/05-39.html. 
 116. James Brooke, Moving to Semantical High Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at 18. 
 117. See, e.g., Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Victims of Their Success, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRON., Nov. 5, 2007, at B1 (detailing the federal prosecution of owners of a county-licensed 
medical marijuana dispensary). 
 118. NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., NORTH CALIFORNIA HIGH INTENSITY DRUG 
TRAFFICKING AREA DRUG MARKET ANALYSIS (June 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ndic/pubs23/23934/drgovr.htm#foot2. 
 119. See Steven Sydney, M.D., et al., Marijuana Use and Mortality, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
585, 585–86 (1997) (discussing a ten year study on thousands of marijuana users in California). 
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marijuana laws are to some, albeit uncertain, degree interfering with the 
implementation of federal law in this area. 
C. Voluntary School Prayer 
In the almost half century since 1962, the Supreme Court has created a 
powerful and consistent jurisprudence banning officially sponsored prayer 
from public schools and public school events.  This line of cases begins with 
Engel v. Vitale, in which the Court held that a school’s policy of having 
students recite state-written prayers (though permitting objecting students to 
remain silent) violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 120  
The following year, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the 
Court extended its holding in Engel to strike down a state law requiring the 
reading aloud of Bible verses at the opening of every school day. 121  Then, in 
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court struck down a state law permitting local schools 
to set aside a minute of silence at the beginning of the school day “for 
meditation or voluntary prayer.” 122  Finally, in two more recent cases the 
Court has extended its Establishment Clause jurisprudence to outside the 
classroom, holding unconstitutional the recitation of prayers at a school 
graduation ceremony,123 and a high school football game.124 
Despite the force and consistency of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area, 
the issue of voluntary school prayer remains highly contentious and 
controversial.  Many proposals have been introduced in Congress, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to thwart the implementation of the Court’s holdings, including 
proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases challenging 
voluntary school prayer,125 and constitutional amendments permitting such 
prayer.126  Moreover, voluntary school prayer was and continues to be 
supported by a large majority of the American population.127  As such, the 
conditions for defiance of the Supreme Court are clearly present.  And indeed, 
 
 120. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962). 
 121. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 122. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41–42, 53 (1985). 
 123. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
 124. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000). 
 125. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal 
Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 254, n.102 (1988) (discussing jurisdiction-stripping proposals); 
Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to Federal 
Jurisdiction, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 500–08 (1983). 
 126. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S37, 18–21 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Byrd) 
(proposing a constitutional amendment permitting voluntary school prayer). 
 127. See ALEC M. GALLUP & FRANK NEWPORT, THE GALLOP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2005 
318 (2007); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 
VA. L. REV. 1, 15, n.69 (1996); Gallop Poll Says 81% Endorse School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
11, 1983, at 55. 
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there is strong empirical evidence that despite the age and consistency of the 
Court’s decisions in this area, local school officials have engaged in a 
consistent, and continuing, pattern of widespread defiance of the rules 
announced by the Court.128  This defiance is most ubiquitous in the South, but 
is by no means limited to that area of the country.129  Such defiance includes 
reciting prayers over loudspeakers, student prayer recitation, and most 
commonly, prayers said at graduation ceremonies and sporting events.130  In 
short, in the area of school prayer, state and (primarily) local officials regularly 
continue to engage in practices that, according to the Supreme Court, are 
patently unconstitutional.131 
What is one to make of this pattern of behavior?  Scholars such as Michael 
Klarman cite it as evidence of the inefficacy of Supreme Court decisions in 
changing social patterns, absent support in society.132  But that seems to me to 
overstate the case—after all, as a consequence of the Court’s decisions most 
school prayer and bible readings have been eliminated from most schools in 
the country, a profound change from conditions in 1962.  But the continuing 
defiance, especially in the South, does demonstrate that there are limits to 
judicial authority.  More interestingly, I would argue that the consequence of 
continuing defiance has been to keep this issue alive, and prevent the school 
prayer cases from becoming settled, and uncontroversial doctrine (as Brown v. 
Board has become).  And, for better or for worse, that fact makes the 
overturning of at least some of those cases more likely, especially given recent 
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court. 
D. The Fugitive Slave Acts 
The three modern examples, set forth above, of state and local officials 
resisting federal authority together suggest such resistance remains an 
important part of the modern federal structure.  Moreover, while the first two 
examples demonstrate resistance to federal statutory policy, the last involves 
resistance to the Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrine, suggesting that 
despite Cooper, state resistance continues to play a role in the dynamic process 
 
 128. Kevin T. McGuire, Public Schools, Religious Establishments, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court: An Examination of Policy Compliance 2, available at http://www.unc.edu/~kmcguire/ 
papers/prayer.pdf; see also Klarman, supra note 127, at 15–16. 
 129. McGuire, supra note 128, at 14–16. 
 130. Id. at 6, 16. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] COOPER v. AARON AND THE FACES OF FEDERALISM 1109 
through which the nation develops constitutional understandings.  The greatest 
example of sustained, regional resistance to federal constitutional authority, 
however, is to be found not in the modern but in the Antebellum Era.  It is the 
story of northern resistance to the Fugitive Slave Acts implementing the 
Fugitive Slave Clause of Article IV—a story with strong, though obviously 
perverse, parallels to the story of southern resistance to Brown. 
Article IV, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution, the Fugitive Slave 
Clause, was almost certainly the most troubling, and most despised, of the 
provisions of the original Constitution.  It reads as follows: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, 
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim 
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.133 
While the Clause protected the delicate sensibilities of the Framers by avoiding 
the use of the word “slave,” it clearly and expressly committed northern states 
to assist in the perpetuation and strengthening of the institution of slavery.  In 
1793, Congress implemented the Fugitive Slave Clause through the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1793.  The Act allowed slave owners pursuing a fleeing slave to 
seize the person and bring him or her before any state or federal judge.  The 
judge was then required to issue a certificate permitting the owner to remove 
the slave from the state (presumably after the judge was satisfied by the proof 
offered of ownership—though the Act was silent on this point).134  Akhil Amar 
argues that the Act, by permitting owners to bypass state courts and officials, 
violated the compromise inherent in Article IV.135  Regardless, in the early 
years following ratification northern judges appeared to generally cooperate in 
the enforcement of the Act (with isolated exceptions),136 though in practice the 
lack of any federal enforcement mechanism and the obvious expense of 
pursuing escaped slaves appears to have hindered effective enforcement.137 
In the 1820s, however, northern attitudes towards the fugitive slave laws 
hardened, and northern states began enacting laws, called “personal liberty 
laws,” which prohibited the seizure or removal of African Americans from the 
state without a state court order, and—importantly—significantly increased the 
 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 134. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (act respecting fugitives from justice, and 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1110 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1087 
procedural protections accorded alleged fugitives from the bare minimum 
provided by federal law.138  The stated (and undoubtedly partially true) 
purpose of these laws was to prevent fraudulent kidnappings of free African 
Americans, based on perjury by alleged owners.139  But the practical effect 
(and undoubtedly also the partial purpose) of the laws was to render recovery 
of fugitive slaves vastly more difficult, because it forced southerners to provide 
substantial evidence in support of their claims of ownership before often 
hostile northern state judges.140  According to Paul Finkelman, the practical 
effect of these laws was to render the Fugitive Slave Act “virtually 
unenforceable” in large parts of the North.141 
The federal response to this situation came in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.142  In Prigg, the Court (by Justice Story) 
struck down Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law as an intrusion on Congress’s 
exclusive power to legislate to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.143  The Prigg 
Court also recognized the inherent right of slave owners to engage in self-help 
by seizing (allegedly) escaped slaves without interference from, or obligation 
to conform with, state processes.144  The only sop Prigg afforded to opponents 
of slavery was a suggestion in dictum that state officials, including judges, 
were under no legal obligation to, and could not be required to, assist in the 
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause or Act.145  After Prigg, state laws 
and state judges could no longer interfere with the return of fugitive slaves, so 
the constitutional rights of southern slave owners were seemingly secure. 
The truth turned out to be more complex.  The northern response to Prigg 
was to enact new laws, which prohibited state judges and other state officials 
such as jailors from participating in the enforcement of the Federal Fugitive 
Slave Act.146  That fact, combined with the complete lack of any federal 
apparatus able to provide assistance to slave owners, meant that effective 
barriers to enforcement of the Act remained very high, especially in light of 
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newly energized state resistance to the Act.  The story of George Latimer 
demonstrates this point.  Latimer, an African American living in Boston, was 
seized by his former master, who obtained an order from Justice Story himself 
permitting Latimer to be held pending proof of identity.  The local sheriff, 
however, refused to permit Latimer to be held in the county jail, forcing the 
owner to sell Latimer to abolitionists for a low price, and Latimer went free.147 
Point, counterpoint continued.  Faced with the unenforceability of the 1793 
Act, southerners extracted from Congress, as part of the Compromise of 1850, 
the new Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.148  That law went well beyond existing 
statutes, by creating a robust federal mechanism for the capture and return of 
fugitive slaves.149  The Act created a new class of officials, federal 
commissioners, who were authorized to issue warrants for the seizure of 
allegedly escaped slaves, and after a pro forma hearing, grant a certificate of 
removal.150  Most significantly, the commissioners were also authorized to 
order U.S. Marshals to assist in the seizure and return of fugitives, and both 
commissioners and marshals were authorized to raise a posse comitatus, a 
group of involuntarily deputized citizens, to assist in these measures.151  This 
new mechanism appeared to have finally shifted the balance of power in favor 
of slave owners, who were now able to successfully retrieve most escaped 
slaves.152 
Resistance, however, also continued.  As Gautham Rao discusses, some 
northerners refused to participate in posse comitatus aimed at seizing fugitive 
slaves, even at the risk of a treason charge.153  An even more telling example is 
the story, recounted by Paul Finkelman, of Anthony Burns.154  Burns was an 
African American man who was seized in Boston in 1854 by his alleged 
former master, pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, and held by federal 
marshals pending the hearing required by the Act.155  The chaotic proceedings 
that followed included a failed rescue attempt which resulted in the death of a 
deputy marshal,156 and a federal courthouse which became occupied by an 
army of federal marshals and soldiers (some of whom were apparently 
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drunk).157  Ultimately, the local, federal commissioner found against Burns, 
who was returned to slavery in Virginia under federal guard.158  The 
consequences of the Burns case did not end there, however.  For one thing, the 
federal commissioner who ruled against Burns, Edward Loring, lost his 
position as professor at the Harvard Law School, 159 and then in 1858 lost his 
position as a state probate judge,160 both largely as a consequence of the Burns 
case.  More significantly, after 1854 the Fugitive Slave Act ceased to be 
enforced in Massachusetts.161  But, the Act was enforced elsewhere in the 
North, and fugitive slaves continued to be returned to the South until 1861, 
when secession, then civil war, then emancipation mooted the issue. 
There are several clear lessons that can be drawn from the story of northern 
resistance to the Fugitive Slave Acts.  First, and most obviously, resistance to 
federal authority, including federal constitutional authority, is not only 
permissible, it is sometimes morally imperative.  It must be remembered that 
when the Prigg Court recognized a constitutional right on the part of slave 
owners to seize and return fugitive slaves, it was, no less than in Brown, saying 
“what the law is.”  Yet surely northerners were justified in continuing to resist 
this constitutional edict.  Second, the story also illustrates the importance of 
state officials, and not just citizens, in resisting federal authority.  When, 
during the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, state officials and legislatures were 
actively involved in resisting the enforcement of federal law, southern slave 
owners were effectively stymied.  When, however, the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850 cut northern state governments out of the process, slave owners became 
far more successful.162  After all, George Latimer went free, but Anthony 
Burns did not.  Finally, the saga also illustrates the many different forms of 
resistance that are possible, from refusals to cooperate with federal authorities 
(on the part of state judges and executive officials), to interfering legislation (in 
the form of the “personal liberty laws”), to outright physical defiance in the 
Burns case.  Each played an important role in maintaining northern resistance 
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and southern outrage, which in turn helped bring about ultimate emancipation 
(albeit after a notably bloody war). 
CONCLUSION: THE FEDERALISM LESSONS OF LITTLE ROCK 
Cooper v. Aaron was a case arising from one of the great constitutional 
crises in American history, generated by systematic resistance, in an entire 
region of the country, to federal authority in the form of a constitutional 
decision of the United States Supreme Court.  It is now widely accepted that 
this resistance was morally reprehensible and ultimately self-destructive.  As a 
consequence, it is unsurprising that one of the most significant lessons that has 
been drawn from Cooper and the Little Rock crisis—a lesson that has its roots 
in the language of the Cooper opinion itself—is that resistance by state 
officials to federal authority, especially federal constitutional authority, is 
illegal and contrary to our system of government.  In this Essay, I have argued 
that that lesson is simply incorrect.  That Brown v. Board was legally and 
morally correct, and southern “massive resistance” was not, does not mean that 
federal authority, including the constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court, 
are always, or even usually, morally or legally correct.  The Warren Court and 
the civil rights struggle was a short, and atypical, era in our constitutional 
history, which is now long since past.  Taking a longer-term view, it should be 
clear that just as constitutionalism is basic to our system of government, so is 
federalism.  To reconcile those two aspects of our polity, it must be recognized 
that states and state officials have a role to play in shaping federal policy and in 
giving meaning to the Constitution.  Further, sometimes the role of state 
officials includes disagreement with, and even active defiance of, the policies 
and meanings championed by federal officials, including the federal judiciary.  
There are, of course, limits to the scope of permissible defiance, which can be 
found in principles of contempt of court, supremacy, and the rule of law.  But 
within those limits, the scope for resistance is in fact quite substantial.  Of 
course, in retrospect it will turn out that sometimes state resistance is justified, 
and sometimes it is not, but there is nothing inherently immoral or 
constitutionally illegitimate in the concept of resistance.  As usual, it all 
depends on the circumstances. 
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